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Abstract
We consider the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) of a single message
out of K messages from N non-colluding and non-replicated databases. Different from
the majority of the existing literature, which considers the case of replicated databases
where all databases store the same content in the form of all K messages, here, we
consider the case of non-replicated databases under a special non-replication structure
where each database stores M out of K messages and each message is stored across R
different databases. This generates an R-regular graph structure for the storage system
where the vertices of the graph are the messages and the edges are the databases. We
derive a general upper bound for M = 2 that depends on the graph structure. We
then specialize the problem to storage systems described by two special types of graph
structures: cyclic graphs and fully-connected graphs. We prove that the PIR capacity
for the case of cyclic graphs is 2K+1 , and the PIR capacity for the case of fully-connected
graphs is min{ 2K ,
1
2}. To that end, we propose novel achievable schemes for both
graph structures that are capacity-achieving. The central insight in both schemes is to
introduce dependency in the queries submitted to databases that do not contain the
desired message, such that the requests can be compressed. In both cases, the results
show severe degradation in PIR capacity due to non-replication.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR), introduced in [1], is a canonical problem to study the
privacy of users as they download content from public databases. In the classical setting, a
user is interested in retrieving a single message (file) out ofK messages fromN replicated and
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 15-26608, CCF 17-13977 and ECCS 18-07348.
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non-colluding databases, in such a way that no database can know the identity of the user’s
desired file. The PIR problem has become a vibrant research topic within information theory
starting with trailblazing papers [2–8]. In [9], Sun and Jafar introduce the PIR capacity,
which is the supremum of the ratio of the number of bits of desired information (L) that
can be retrieved privately to the total downloaded information. They characterize the PIR
capacity of the classical PIR problem to be CPIR = (1+
1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1
)−1. The fundamental
limits of many interesting variants of the problem have been investigated in [10–56].
A common assumption in most of these works is that the entire message set is replicated
across all databases. This is crucial for constructing capacity-achieving schemes, as in many
existing schemes the undesired symbols downloaded from one database are exploited as side
information in the remaining databases, and replication is the key that enables downloading
any bit from any database and using it as side information at any other database. However,
the replication assumption may not be practical in next-generation storage systems and
networks. From a storage point of view, message replication is impractical as it incurs high
storage cost, especially for storage systems with a large number of messages or files with
a large size. From a network structure point of view, in next-generation networks where
peer-to-peer (P2P) connections will be prevalent, nodes (i.e., databases) may not necessarily
possess the same set of messages. These practical scenarios, which challenge the replication
assumption, motivate investigating PIR in non-replicated storage systems. In this work,
we aim at devising achievable schemes that do not rely on message replication, and at the
same time, that are more efficient than the trivial scheme of downloading the contents of
all databases. We aim at evaluating the loss in the PIR rate due to non-replication and
investigating the interplay between the storage structure and the resulting PIR rate.
A few works have considered relaxing the replication assumption: Reference [14] inves-
tigates the case when the contents of the databases are encoded via an (N,Kc) MDS code
instead of assuming data replication. [14] derives the PIR capacity for this setting, which
reveals a fundamental tradeoff between storage cost and retrieval cost. Reference [40] stud-
ies the PIR problem from storage constrained databases. In this problem, each database is
constrained to store µKL uncoded bits with µ ≤ 1 (as opposed to KL bits needed in repli-
cated databases). [40] shows that symmetric batch caching, which was originally introduced
for centralized coded caching systems in [57], results in the largest possible PIR rate under
storage constraints. This problem is extended to the decentralized setting in [54], where
each database stores µKL bits randomly and independently from any other database. [54]
shows that uniform and random bit selection, which was introduced for decentralized coded
caching systems in [58], results in the largest possible PIR rate under storage constraints.
The work that is most closely related to our work here is [55]. The databases in [55] store
different subsets of the message set. Different from the previous works on non-replication
such as [40, 54], in [55] databases store full messages and not portions of every message. In
particular, [55] investigates the case when every message is replicated across two databases
2
only. This storage system, in this case, can be represented by a graph, in which every two
databases are connected via an edge corresponding to the common message. [55] proposes an
achievable PIR scheme that is immune against colluding databases, that do not form a cycle
in the graph. The scheme in [55] achieves a retrieval rate of 1
N
. The work in [55] highlights
some interesting insights about the relation between some combinatorial properties of the
graph and the immunity against database collusion. In the extended version of [55] in [56],
which has appeared concurrently and independently of our work here, an upper bound is
proposed to show that their PIR rate is at most a factor of 2 from the optimal value for
regular graphs, and the techniques are extended to larger replication factors.
In this paper, we consider PIR of a single message out of K messages from N non-
replicated and non-colluding databases. In our formulation, each message appears in R
different databases, and every database stores M different messages. Thus, the storage
system is parameterized by (K,R,M,N) such that KR =MN , where K is the total number
of messages in the system, R is the replication factor of each message, M is the storage
constraint of each database, and N is the number of databases. We focus on the caseM = 2.
For this case, the storage system can be uniquely specified by an R-regular graph. In our
graph formulation, the messages correspond to the vertices and the databases correspond to
the edges. This is in contrast to [55], where R = 2, and the roles of messages and databases
are reversed on the graph. Hence, our graph formulation may be considered as the dual
graph formulation to [55]. Our goal is to characterize the PIR capacity of this system.
First, we derive a general upper bound on the retrieval rate for storage systems described
by R-regular graphs. Interestingly, the upper bound depends on the structure of the graph
and not only on (K,R,M,N). In particular, the upper bound is related to the longest
sequence of databases that cover all of the K messages in the storage system. We specialize
the problem further to two classes of graphs, namely, cyclic graphs and fully-connected
graphs, where we obtain exact results. In cyclic graphs, all vertices form a circle connected
by edges. Therefore, each vertex (a message) emanates two edges (two databases), which
means that each message is common among two adjacent databases which are arranged in
a cycle. Thus, in this case R = 2, and since M = 2 in this paper, using KR = MN
mentioned above, we have, K = N . For this type of graphs, we show that CPIR =
2
K+1
. The
achievable scheme starts from the greedy algorithm of Sun and Jafar [9] and then compresses
the requests to K − 2 databases by replacing the individual symbols of the scheme in [9]
by sum of two messages. This compression necessitates exploiting side information even in
databases that do not contain the desired messages. In fully-connected graphs, each vertex is
connected to all of the remainingK−1 vertices. Therefore, each vertex (a message) emanates
K − 1 edges (K − 1 databases), which means that each message resides in K − 1 databases.
Thus, in this case R = K−1, and since M = 2, from KR =MN , we have N = K(K−1)/2,
i.e., N =
(
K
2
)
. That is, all
(
K
2
)
combinations of two messages appear in a different database.
In this case, we show that CPIR = min{
2
K
, 1
2
}. For K ≥ 4, for this case, we propose a
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novel achievable scheme, which is based on retrieving a single weighted sum (with respect
to sufficiently large field) of two symbols from every database. For the comparable cases
with [55], our scheme outperforms their scheme in terms of the PIR rate. We note that, in
both cyclic and fully-connected graph cases, the PIR capacity converges to zero as N →∞,
which implies a severe degradation in the PIR efficiency due to non-replication.
Finally, we show an example for a storage system with M = 3. We provide a novel
achievable scheme that uses processed side information and outperforms the scheme in [55].
2 Problem Formulation
Consider the problem of PIR from N non-replicated and non-colluding databases. We denote
the databases by D = {D1, D2, · · · , DN}. The storage system stores K messages in total,
each message is stored across R different databases, i.e., R is the repetition factor for every
message, and each database stores locally M different messages. We denote the message set
by W = {W1,W2, · · · ,WK}. Each message Wk ∈ F
L
q is a vector of length L picked in an
i.i.d. fashion from a sufficiently large finite field FLq ,
H(Wk) = L, k ∈ {1, · · · , K} (1)
H(W) = H(W1,W2, · · · ,WK) = KL, (q-ary symbols) (2)
The storage system is parameterized by (K,R,M,N). We note that for a feasible storage
system (that is symmetric across databases and messages), we have KR = MN . In this
work, we focus on the case M = 2. To fully characterize the storage system in this case,
we represent the storage system as R-regular graph1; see Fig. 1 and Table 1 for a (6, 3, 2, 9)
example. We characterize the storage system by a (V,E) regular graph, where V = W =
{W1,W2, · · · ,WK} is the set of vertices, and E = D = {D1, D2, · · · , DN} is the set of
edges, i.e., in this graph, the vertices are the messages and the edges are the databases. An
edge Dj drawn between messages Wm and Wk means that the contents of database Dj is
Zj = {Wm,Wk}. This graph is an R-regular graph, since each message is repeated R times
across the storage system. In the following, we define specific parameters of the graph, which
are needed while constructing the converse proof.
Definition 1 (Graph reduction) The graph (V,E) = (W,D) is reduced iteratively start-
ing with the vertex W1 by enumerating all the edges connecting to W1, and removing all
neighboring vertices connected to enumerated edges except one, which we denote by W˜2. The
process of enumerating edges and removing corresponding neighbors iteratively continues until
one vertex is left W˜κ+1 after κ reductions.
1We note that the graph used in our formulation may be considered as the dual graph of the one used
in [55]. In our work, M = 2, the nodes are the messages and the edges are the databases, while in [55],
R = 2, the nodes are the databases and the edges are the messages.
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D5
W1
W2
W3
W4
W5
W6
D1
D2
D3
D4
D7
D6 D8
D9
Figure 1: Graph structure for an example (6, 3, 2, 9) storage system.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9
W1 W1 W1 W2 W2 W3 W3 W4 W5
W2 W4 W6 W3 W5 W4 W6 W5 W6
Table 1: Contents of databases for the example (6, 3, 2, 9) system specified by graph in Fig. 1.
Definition 2 (Spread of the graph) The spread of a graph δ is the largest sequence of
edges (databases) that results from the graph reduction procedure given in Definition 1.
An example graph reduction for the (6, 3, 2, 9) storage system given in Fig. 1 and Table 1
is shown in Fig. 2. In this work, we further focus on two special classes of R-regular graphs,
namely: cyclic graphs and fully-connected graphs.
Definition 3 (Cyclic graphs) The graph (V,E) = (W,D) is called a cyclic graph if each
two adjacent vertices are connected by an edge and no non-adjacent vertices are connected
by an edge, i.e., the contents of the databases can be written as (without loss of generality):
Z1 = {W1,W2}
Z2 = {W2,W3}
...
ZN−1 = {WN−1,WN}
ZN = {WN ,W1} (3)
Consequently, the cyclic graph is parameterized by (K,R,M,N) = (K, 2, 2, K), and the
spread of the graph is δ = K − 1.
Definition 4 (Fully-connected graphs) The graph (V,E) = (W,D) is called fully-connected
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Enumerate D1, D2, D3
W2
W3
W4
W5
W6
D1
D2
D3
D4
D7
D6 D8
D9
D5
W1
(a)
Enumerate D4, D5
W2
W3 W5
D4
D5
Remove W1,W4,W6
(b)
Figure 2: Graph reduction for the example (6, 3, 2, 9) storage system. The end result of
graph reduction is the sequence of databases (edges) D1, D2, D3, D4, D5. (a) Neighbors of
W1 are specified and the connected databases are enumerated. (b) All neighboring vertices
except W2 are removed, and so on.
if every two vertices are connected by a unique edge. Hence, the contents of the databases can
be written as the
(
K
2
)
subsets of {1, · · · , K} with 2 elements. The fully-connected graph is
parameterized by (K,R,M,N) = (K,K−1, 2,
(
K
2
)
), and the spread of the graph is δ = K−1.
In PIR, the user wants to retrieve a message Wk without leaking any information about
the identity of the message to any individual database. To that end, the user sends N
queries, one for each database. These queries are independent of the messages as the user
has no information about the messages prior to retrieval, hence,
I(W;Q
[k]
1:N ) = 0, k ∈ [K] (4)
The databases respond to the user queries by answer strings A
[k]
1:N . The answer string
A
[k]
n is a deterministic function of the query Q
[k]
n and the contents of the database Dn, which
is denoted by Zn, therefore,
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n , Zn) = 0, n ∈ [N ] (5)
In PIR, we have two formal requirements. First, we have the privacy requirement. To
ensure privacy, the retrieval strategy intended to retrieve Wi must be indistinguishable from
the retrieval strategy intended to retrieve Wj for any i and j, i.e.,
(Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W) ∼ (Q
[j]
n , A
[j]
n ,W), n ∈ [N ], i, j ∈ [K] (6)
where ∼ denotes statistical equivalence.
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The second requirement is the reliability requirement. The user needs to be able to
reconstruct Wk perfectly
2 from the collected answers, i.e.,
H(Wk|Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N) = 0 (7)
We measure the efficiency of the retrieval scheme by the retrieval rate RPIR. An achievable
retrieval scheme is a scheme that satisfies (6), (7) for some message length L. The retrieval
rate is the ratio between the length of the desired message L and the total download,
RPIR =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
(8)
The PIR capacity is the largest PIR rate over all achievable schemes, i.e., CPIR = supRPIR.
3 Main Results
In this section, we present the main results of this paper. Our first result is a general upper
bound for storage systems defined by R-regular graphs with M = 2 and arbitrary (K,R,N)
which is given in the following theorem. The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 4.
Theorem 1 (Upper-bound for R-regular graphs) For an R-regular graph storage sys-
tem with (K,R,M,N) = (K,R, 2, N), the retrieval rate is upper bounded by
RPIR ≤ min
{
R
N
,
1
1 + δ
R
}
(9)
Remark 1 The upper bound reveals a dependency on the structure of the storage system,
captured in the spread of the graph δ. I.e., the upper bound cannot be parameterized by
(K,R,M,N) only. This opens the door for joint optimization of the storage system together
with the retrieval scheme.
Remark 2 The upper bound RPIR ≤
1
1+ δ
R
is a general upper bound which is valid for any
storage system with M = 2 and is represented via an R-regular graph (including the example
shown in Figs. 1 and 2). In this paper, we focus on two special cases, namely:
• Cyclic graphs: In this case, the spread of the graph is δ = K − 1 as we can cover all
the messages in the storage system by visiting exactly K − 1 databases. Furthermore,
R = 2, as every node in the graph is connected to 2 adjacent nodes only. Applying the
bound in Theorem 1, RPIR ≤
1
1+ δ
R
= 1
1+K−1
2
= 2
K+1
.
2The results of this work do not change if we relaxed the reliability constraint to allow arbitrarily small
probability of error, i.e., if we changed the reliability constraint as H(Wk|Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ) = o(L).
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• Fully-connected graphs: In this case, the spread of the graph is δ = R asW1 is connected
to all other messages. Applying the bound in Theorem 1, RPIR ≤
1
1+ δ
R
= 1
1+R
R
= 1
2
.
Also, in this case, R = K−1 and N = K(K−1)/2, hence, RPIR ≤
R
N
= (K−1)
K(K−1)/2
= 2
K
.
In the following two results, we characterize the PIR capacity of cyclic graphs and fully-
connected graphs. The converse proofs for Theorems 2 and 3 are corollaries of Theorem 1
as shown in Remark 2. The achievability proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are given in Section 5.
Theorem 2 (Capacity of cyclic graphs) For a cyclic graph storage system, the PIR ca-
pacity is given by
CPIR =
2
K + 1
(10)
Theorem 3 (Capacity of fully-connected graphs) For a fully-connected graph storage
system with M = 2, the PIR capacity is given by
CPIR =
{
1
2
, K = 2, 3
2
K
, K ≥ 4
(11)
Remark 3 The capacity results in this work reveal a severe loss in the retrieval rate due
to non-replication. For the cyclic and fully-connected graphs, CPIR → 0 as N → ∞. This
is in contrast to the classical PIR problem [9], where CPIR → 1 as N → ∞. This is
intuitively due to the fact that as N → ∞, we have K → ∞. Meanwhile, the number of
side information equations generated is limited due to non-replication. In particular, the side
information equations are related to R−1 (in contrast to N−1 in the classical model), while
total downloads grow with N as the user needs to download from all databases to satisfy the
privacy constraint. The ratio R
N
→ 0 as N →∞ for both cases.
Remark 4 The results of this work outperform the trivial scheme of downloading all mes-
sages, which achieves 1
K
. Our retrieval rate also outperforms the best achievable scheme
in [55], which achieves 1
N
for cyclic graphs (which is the comparable case to our work). The
achievable rate 1
N
= 1
K
< 2
K+1
for the case of cyclic graphs. This implies that the retrieval
rates in non-replicated PIR systems in [55] may be improved. Nevertheless, the results in [55]
are more general which are valid for all (K, 2,M,N) graph-based storage systems. The results
in [55] also cover collusion resistance, which is outside the scope of our work here.
4 Converse Proof
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. To that end, we present a general upper bound for the
retrieval rate for general R-regular graphs for the case of M = 2.
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Let Q denote the collection of all queries to all databases for all desired messages, i.e.,
Q ,
{
Q[k]n : k ∈ [K], n ∈ [N ]
}
(12)
We assume that the retrieval scheme is symmetric across databases (as in [8, Lemma 1]).
This assumption is without loss of generality, since any asymmetric retrieval scheme can be
transformed into a symmetric one by means of time-sharing without changing the retrieval
rate. Hence, for m ∈ {1, · · · , K}, we have
H(A
[m]
1 |Q) = H(A
[m]
n |Q), n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (13)
H(A
[m]
1 |W \ {Wm},Q) = H(A
[m]
n |W \ {Wm},Q), n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (14)
where W \ {Wm} = {W1,W2, · · · ,Wm−1,Wm+1, · · · ,WK}. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let Rm denote the set of databases containing message Wm, then
H(A[m]n |W \ {Wm},Q) ≥
L
R
, n ∈ Rm (15)
Proof: We have
L = H(Wm) (16)
= H(Wm|W \ {Wm},Q) (17)
= H(Wm|W \ {Wm},Q)−H(Wm|W \ {Wm},Q, A
[m]
1:N) (18)
= H(Wm|W \ {Wm},Q)−H(Wm|W \ {Wm},Q, A
[m]
Rm
) (19)
= I(Wm;A
[m]
Rm
|W \ {Wm},Q) (20)
= H(A
[m]
Rm
|W \ {Wm},Q) (21)
≤ RH(A[m]n |W \ {Wm},Q), n ∈ Rm (22)
where (17) follows from the fact that Wm is independent of the messages and the queries
(W\{Wm},Q), (18) follows from the reliability constraint. For (19), we note that the answer
strings A
[m]
[N ]\Rm
= {A
[m]
n : n 6∈ Rm} are deterministic functions of (W \{Wm},Q) only, hence
Wm → (W \ {Wm},Q)→ A
[m]
[N ]\Rm
is a Markov chain and A
[m]
[N ]\Rm
can be dropped from the
conditioning. (21) follows from the fact that answer strings are deterministic functions of the
messages and queries, and (22) follows from the database symmetry in (14). Rearranging
(22) concludes the proof. 
We are now ready to prove the converse statement in Theorem 1. We first prove that
RPIR ≤
R
N
. From Lemma 1, we have
L ≤ RH(A[m]n |W \ {Wm},Q), n ∈ Rm (23)
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=
R
N
NH(A[m]n |W \ {Wm},Q) (24)
≤
R
N
NH(A[m]n |Q) (25)
=
R
N
N∑
n=1
H(A[m]n |Q) (26)
where (25) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (26) follows from the
symmetry across databases. Therefore,
RPIR =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[m]
n )
≤
L∑N
n=1H(A
[m]
n |Q)
≤
R
N
(27)
Next, we prove that RPIR ≤
1
1+ δ
R
, where δ is the spread of the graph; see Definition 2.
In order to obtain the spread of the graph, we begin by the node representing W1, then
we enumerate all the edges (databases) connecting to W1. Without loss of generality, label
these databases by 1, 2, · · · , R. These edges are connecting to the nodes corresponding to
{Wn1,Wn2 , · · · ,WnR}. Then, we reduce the graph by removing all the connecting nodes
to W1 except one (which belongs to the path of the largest distance), which we denote by
W˜2 ∈ {Wn1,Wn2, · · · ,WnR}. We again enumerate all the edges connecting to W˜2 with the
nodes {WnR+1 ,WnR+2, · · · ,WnR+δ2}, where δ2 is the number of databases that contain W˜2
after the graph reduction, then we reduce the graph again by removing all nodes connecting
to W˜2 except one, which we denote by W˜3, and so on. Then, we have
L = H(W1) (28)
= H(W1|Q)−H(W1|A
[1]
1:N ,Q) (29)
= I(W1;A
[1]
1:N |Q) (30)
= H(A
[1]
1:N |Q)−H(A
[1]
1:N |W1,Q) (31)
≤ NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−H(A
[1]
1:N |W1,Q) (32)
≤ NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−H(A
[1]
∆ |W1,Q) (33)
= NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−
δ∑
i=1
H(A
[1]
i |W1,Q, A
[1]
1:i−1) (34)
≤ NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−
δ∑
i=1
H(A
[1]
i |W1,W \ {Wni},Q, A
[1]
1:i−1) (35)
= NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−
δ∑
i=1
H(A
[1]
i |W1,W \ {Wni},Q) (36)
where (29) follows from the reliability constraint and the independence of queries and mes-
sages, (32) follows from the independence bound, (33) follows from the non-negativity of
the entropy function where A
[1]
∆ denotes the answer strings returned by the sequence of the
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databases that define the spread of the graph, and (35) follows from the fact that conditioning
on W \ {Wi} cannot increase entropy.
To show (36), we note that from the reduction procedure that results in A
[1]
∆ , we have
A
[1]
i =


fi(Q,W1,Wni), 1 ≤ i ≤ R
fi(Q, W˜2,Wni), R + 1 ≤ i ≤ R + δ2
fi(Q, W˜3,Wni), R + δ2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ R + δ2 + δ3
...
fi(Q, W˜κ,Wni), R +
∑κ−1
j=2 δj + 1 ≤ i ≤ R +
∑κ
j=2 δj
(37)
for some deterministic function fi(·), and κ is the number of reductions on the graph until
all nodes are removed from the graph. Since the leading message at the jth graph reduction
W˜j belongs to the set of the connected messages in the (j − 1)th graph reduction, and
at the jth graph reduction, the nodes connecting to W˜j are removed from the graph, we
have {W˜2, W˜3, · · · , W˜j(i)} ⊆ {Wn1,Wn2 , · · · ,Wni−1} ⊆ W \ {Wni}, where j(i) is the index
of the leading message in the ith database. Consequently, we can drop A
[1]
1:i−1 as they are
deterministic functions of (Q,W1,W \ {Wni}).
Now, we have
L ≤ NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−
δ∑
i=1
H(A
[1]
i |W1,W \ {Wni},Q) (38)
= NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−
δ∑
i=1
H(A
[ni]
i |W1,W \ {Wni},Q) (39)
≤ NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−
δ∑
i=1
L
R
(40)
= NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)−
δL
R
(41)
where (39) follows from the privacy constraint, and (40) follows from Lemma 1. Reordering
terms, we have
RPIR =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[m]
n )
≤
L
NH(A
[1]
1 |Q)
≤
1
1 + δ
R
(42)
which together with (27) concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Achievability Proof
In this section, we begin first with a motivating example of (K,R,M,N) = (3, 2, 2, 3) to
show the basic ingredients of the achievable scheme. In fact, the graph for this motivating
11
D3
W1
W2 W3
D1 D2
Figure 3: Graph structure for the (3, 2, 2, 3) system used as a motivating example.
Database 1 (D1) Database 2 (D2) Database 3 (D3)
W1 W1 W2
W2 W3 W3
Table 2: Contents of databases for the (3, 2, 2, 3) system specified by graph in Fig. 3.
example is both cyclic and fully-connected (see Fig. 3), therefore, this motivating example
can be considered as a unifying instance of the optimal scheme for both cyclic and fully-
connected graphs. Then, we present general capacity-achieving schemes for cyclic graphs and
fully-connected graphs. Finally, we show by an example how we can extend the presented
schemes to the case of M ≥ 3 (with no claim of optimality).
5.1 Motivating Example: K = 3, R = 2, M = 2, N = 3
In this example, we consider a storage system that consists of N = 3 databases. The system
stores K = 3 messages in total, namelyW1,W2,W3. Each message is replicated across R = 2
databases, such that each database stores M = 2 messages (see Table 2). This is a cyclic
and also a fully-connected graph as shown in Fig. 3.
Without loss of generality, assume that the desired message is W1. To construct the
capacity-achieving scheme, the user randomly permutes the indices of messages W1,W2,W3
independently, uniformly, and privately from the databases. Denote the permuted version of
W1 by the vector (a1, · · · , aL), the permuted version ofW2 by (b1, · · · , bL), and the permuted
version of W3 by (c1, · · · , cL). Pick L = 12.
A straightforward solution for this problem is to apply Sun and Jafar scheme in [9]. Since
every database contains M = 2 messages, the user downloads a single bit from each message
from each database in round 1, i.e., the user downloads a1, b1 from database 1, a2, c1 from
database 2, and b2, c2 from database 3. Now, the user exploits b2, c2 as side information
by downloading a3 + b2 from database 1, and a4 + c2 from database 2. Finally, the user
downloads the sum b3 + c3 from database 3. The query table for this scheme is shown in
Table 3. Note that although the sum b3 + c3 is irrelevant to the decodability of W1, the user
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needs to download it to satisfy the privacy constraint. Otherwise, database 3 would figure
out that the desired message is W1, as the user requests 2 bits from database 3 when the
desired message is W1, while the user would have requested 3 bits from database 3 if the
desired message was W2 or W3. With this scheme, the user downloads 4 bits from W1 out
of the total 9 downloads, hence RPIR =
4
9
.
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1 a2 b2
b1 c1 c2
a3 + b2 a4 + c2 b3 + c3
Table 3: Sun and Jafar scheme for the K = 3, R = 2, M = 2, N = 3 example.
Although this scheme outperforms the scheme in [55] in terms of the retrieval rate (the
scheme in [55] achieves RPIR =
1
3
), there is room for improving it. The main source of
inefficiency of the scheme is the downloads from database 3, as the user downloads 3 bits
and exploits only 2 of them. Moreover, the user downloads new independent bit b3 + c3.
If the user introduces dependency to the downloads of database 3, the user may compress3
the requests from database 3, and improve the retrieval rate. In order to do this, the user
downloads the sums b1 + c2 and b2 + c1 from database 3 (see Table 4). For the decodability,
the user can decode c2 by canceling b1 from b1 + c2 and b2 by canceling c1 from b2 + c1.
Therefore, a3, a4 are decodable by canceling b2 and c2.
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1 a2
b1 c1
a3 + b2 a4 + c2 b1 + c2
b2 + c1
Table 4: Compressing the scheme of Sun and Jafar for K = 3, R = 2, M = 2, N = 3.
Nevertheless, the scheme in Table 4 is not private because the user still downloads 2 bits
from database 3 in the form of sum of 2 bits. To remedy this problem, the user should repeat
the compression of the downloads over all databases, i.e., the user should download 2 bits in
the same manner of downloading from database 3 in the other two databases as well. Hence,
in repetition 2, the user compresses the downloads from database 2 and downloads a7 + c3,
3Throughout this work, we use the expressions “dependency” and “compression”. In previous PIR works,
the user downloads new and independent undesired symbols at each round, which can be used in later rounds
as side information. However, in this work, the user downloads undesired symbols which are dependent on
the undesired symbols downloaded from other databases. We download these dependent symbols even from
the databases that do not contain the desired message. We call these “dependent” downloads to differentiate
them from “side information” downloads, which are intended to be used to decode the desired message
directly. Furthermore, by “compression”, we mean downloading shorter (fewer) answer strings than the
greedy algorithm in [9] by exploiting the knowledge of the dependent symbols.
13
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
re
p
.
1
a1 a2
b1 c1
a3 + b2 a4 + c2 b1 + c2
b2 + c1
re
p
.
2
a5 b4
b3 c3
a6 + b4 a7 + c3 b3 + c4
a8 + c4
re
p
.
3
a9 b5
c5 c6
a10 + b5 a12 + c6 b6 + c5
a11 + b6
Table 5: Complete query structure for the capacity-achieving scheme for K = 3, R = 2,
M = 2, N = 3.
a8 + c4. Similarly, in repetition 3, the user downloads a10 + b5 and a11 + b6 from database 1.
The complete query structure is given in Table 5.
Next, we discuss privacy, decodability and the rate of this achievable scheme.
Regarding privacy: The query structure is now symmetric across the databases, and the
indices of the bits from each message are chosen uniformly, independently and privately.
Hence, all queries are equally likely, and the scheme is private.
Regarding decodability: We note that each repetition is decodable separately. As we
discussed above, a1, · · · , a4 are decodable in repetition 1. For repetition 2, a5 is decodable
directly, a6 is decodable by canceling b4 from a6+b4, and a7 is decodable by canceling c3 from
a7 + c3. Finally, c4 is decodable by canceling b3 from b3 + c4 and therefore a8 is decodable
by further canceling c4 from a8 + c4 (or equivalently by adding a8 + c4 and b3 + c4 under
modulo-2 addition and canceling b3 from the sum). The decodability of repetition 3 follows
in a similar way to the decodability of repetition 2 by exchanging the roles of W2,W3.
Regarding the achievable rate: The user downloads 12 bits from W1 out of a total of 24
downloads. Consequently, RPIR =
12
24
= 1
2
which matches the upper bound in Theorem 1.
Remark 5 It is interesting to compare the PIR capacity here to the PIR capacity in [40]
where the contents are stored in the databases using the optimal storage strategy under the
memory-size constraint µ. Note that, in this example, µ = 2
3
as every database stores 2 full
messages out of 3 messages. Using the optimal storage strategy in [40], the PIR capacity is
CPIR = (1+
1
2
+ 1
22
)−1 = 4
7
which is larger than the PIR capacity here CPIR =
1
2
. This implies
a loss in the PIR capacity due to storing full messages here as opposed to storing uncoded
parts of the messages in [40] subject to the same memory-size constraint.
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5.2 General Achievability for the Case of Cyclic Graphs
In this section, we generalize the ideas of the motivating example for arbitrary K. The new
ingredient in this scheme (in contrast to [9]) is the compression of the queries submitted for
a subset of the databases. To satisfy the privacy constraint, the user performs the scheme
along
(
N
2
)
=
(
K
2
)
repetitions. In each repetition, the user chooses to submit the full query
(according to [9]) to 2 databases. For the remaining databases, the user downloads two
symbols in the form of 2-sums. The scheme works with L = 4
(
K
2
)
symbols. The general
scheme for cyclic graphs can be summarized as:
1. Index preparation: The indices of the symbols of each message are permuted indepen-
dently, uniformly, and privately at the user side.
2. Constructing full queries: We apply the scheme of Sun and Jafar [9] to construct the
full queries to all databases. We apply this scheme over blocks of L˜ = 4. To that
end, the user downloads 1 individual symbol from each message from each database in
round 1. Next, the user downloads a 2-sum from the stored messages in each database.
This sum exploits the side information generated from other databases. Note that
since R = 2 in this graph, the user can generate 1 side information equation for each
database. Another change from [9] is that even for the K − 2 databases that do not
contain the desired message, the user exploits the side information generated at other
databases by introducing dependency to the answers.
3. Compressing queries: The user choose different K − 2 databases at each repetition.
The user compresses the queries to these databases by adding the individual symbols
in round 1 into single equation.4
4. Repeat step 2, 3 over new blocks of 4 symbols for
(
K
2
)
repetitions.
5.2.1 Decodability, Privacy, and Achievable Rate
Regarding decodability: In this scheme, at each repetition, we have 4 unknowns correspond-
ing to the desired message and 2(K−1) unknowns corresponding to the undesired messages.
The user downloads 3 equations (full queries) from 2 databases, and 2 equations from the
remaining databases. Hence, the user downloads in total 6 + 2(K − 2) = 2K + 2 equations
in 2(K−1)+4 unknowns. This linear system is decodable (up to necessary index shuffling).
4We note that in some cases, we may need to shuffle the indices of the symbols in the sum to prevent
ending up with useless equations. For example, if the full queries are in the form of b2, c1, b1 + c2, then,
after compressing, we have the 2-sums b2+ c1, and b1+ c2. Now, imagine that b2 and c1 are decodable from
the remaining databases. In this case, the sum of b2 + c1 is useless and the sum b1 + c2 is not decodable.
However, if we shuffle the indices such that the user downloads b2 + c2 and b1 + c2, then the user can use
both equations to decode b1 and c2. This would not affect the privacy as the indices are permuted uniformly
and privately at the user side.
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Regarding privacy: The scheme is private since the symbols are permuted randomly and
privately at the user side and the scheme is repeated along all
(
K
2
)
combinations of the
databases. Hence, the structure of the queries is the same across all databases. Thus, the
distribution of the queries is the same irrespective to the desired message.
Regarding the achievable rate: From every repetition of the scheme, the user can decode
4 symbols from the desired message, thus,
RPIR =
4
2(K − 2) + 3 ∗ 2
=
2
K + 1
(43)
5.3 General Achievability for the Case of Fully-Connected Graphs
In this section, we present the general achievability for the case of fully-connected graphs.
For K = 2, we have 1 database containing 2 messages; the capacity-achieving scheme is
simply to download the contents of the entire database, hence CPIR =
1
2
. For K = 3, the
capacity-achieving scheme is exactly the motivating example in Section 5.1, hence RPIR =
1
2
.
For K ≥ 4, the upper bound RPIR ≤
2
K
is the active upper bound. The general achiev-
ability for this case is given below. The achievable scheme works with L = R = K − 1
symbols from Fq, where q is sufficiently large and is prime.
1. Index preparation: The indices of the symbols of each message is permuted indepen-
dently, uniformly, and privately at the user side.
2. Retrieval from database 1: Denote the permuted contents of the nth database by
Zn =
{
X
(n)
1 , X
(n)
2
}
. Without loss of generality, assume that the desired message is
stored in database 1, hence, X
(1)
1 is the permuted version of the desired message. From
database 1, the user downloads a weighted sum of two symbols from the two messages,
i.e., the user downloads α
(1)
1 X
(1)
1 (1) + α
(1)
2 X
(1)
2 (1) from database 1, where α
(n)
m ∈ Fq,
m ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ [N ]. The choice of α
(n)
m will be specified later.
3. Exploiting side information: The user downloads different weighted sums from every
database. If the nth database contains the desired message, the user downloads a new
desired symbol in the sum. If the message stored in the nth database is undesired, the
user exploits the same message symbol in all databases. I.e., the user downloads the
weighted sum α
(n)
1 X
(n)
1 (i) +α
(1)
2 X
(1)
2 (j), where indices i, j are chosen depending on the
message (if desired, we increment the index; if undesired we fix the index to 1)
4. Database symmetry: The user repeats the last step across all databases.
5.3.1 Decodability, Privacy, and Achievable Rate
Regarding decodability: The user collects N =
(
K
2
)
equations. These equations have
L = K − 1 unknowns corresponding to the desired message and K − 1 unknowns corre-
sponding to the undesired messages, i.e., we have a linear system of
(
K
2
)
equations in 2K−2
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unknowns. Without loss of generality, assume that the desired message is stored in the first
K − 1 databases, hence Wk = {X
(1)
1 (1), X
(2)
1 (2), · · · , X
(K−1)
1 (K − 1)}. The linear system of
equations can be written as:


α
(1)
1 0 · · · 0 α
(1)
2 0 0 · · · 0
0 α
(2)
1 · · · 0 0 α
(2)
2 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · α
(K−1)
1 0 0 0 · · · α
(K−1)
2
0 0 · · · 0 α
(K)
1 α
(K)
2 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · α
(K2 )
1 α
(K2 )
2


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ


X
(1)
1 (1)
X
(2)
1 (2)
...
X
(K−1)
1 (K − 1)
X
(1)
2 (1)
X
(2)
2 (1)
...
X
(K−1)
2 (1)


=


A
[k]
1
A
[k]
2
...
A
[k]
K−1
A
[k]
K
A
[k]
K+1
...
A
[k]
(K2 )


(44)
The choice of the coefficients α
(n)
m ∈ Fq, m ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ [N ] is such that the decoding matrix
Ψ is invertible. One simple way5 to choose α =
(
α
(1)
1 , α
(1)
2 , α
(2)
1 , · · · , α
(K2 )
2
)
is to choose
uniformly from all possible P (q, 2
(
K
2
)
) = q!
(q−2(K2 ))!
permutations of the field elements.
Regarding privacy: Since the message symbols and the coefficients are permuted uni-
formly, and the distribution of the queries for every database is the same irrespective of the
desired message, the retrieval scheme is private.
Regarding the achievable rate: The user downloads N =
(
K
2
)
answer strings, L = K − 1
of which are desired symbols and are decodable, thus,
RPIR =
K − 1(
K
2
) = 2
K
(45)
5.3.2 Further Example: Fully-Connected Graph with K = 4
As a concrete example, we present the achievable scheme for K = 4 for a fully-connected
graph. Hence, we have N =
(
K
2
)
= 6 databases and R = K−1 = 3. Thus, this is a (4, 3, 2, 6)
system. We assume that Z1 = {W1,W2}, Z2 = {W1,W3}, Z3 = {W1,W4}, Z4 = {W2,W3},
Z5 = {W2,W4}, and Z6 = {W3,W4}. See Fig. 4 and Table 6 for the graph structure and the
database contents. Assume for sake of simplicity that α = (1, 2, · · · , 12) ∈ F1213. The scheme
works with L = 3 bits. Denote the permuted message W1 by (a1, a2, a3), W2 by (b1, b2, b3),
and so on. Assume without loss of generality that the user is interested in retrieving W1.
Therefore, the user downloads the following:
A
[1]
1 = a1 + 2b1 (46)
5In general, one can enumerate all possible Ψ that are full rank for every desired message Wk. The user
can choose Ψ uniformly from this set.
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D5
W2
W3
W1
W4
D1
D2
D3D4
D6
Figure 4: Graph structure for the (4, 3, 2, 6) system which is fully-connected with K = 4.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
W1 W1 W1 W2 W2 W3
W2 W3 W4 W3 W4 W4
Table 6: Contents of databases for the (4, 3, 2, 6) system specified by graph in Fig. 4
A
[1]
2 = 3a2 + 4c1 (47)
A
[1]
3 = 5a3 + 6d1 (48)
A
[1]
4 = 7b1 + 8c1 (49)
A
[1]
5 = 9b1 + 10d1 (50)
A
[1]
6 = 11c1 + 12d1 (51)
This system of equations is full-rank, hence W1 is decodable along with b1, c1, d1. The rate
of retrieval is RPIR =
3
6
= 1
2
. To see privacy, let the desired message be W2, in which case,
the user downloads:
A
[2]
1 = a1 + 2b1 (52)
A
[2]
2 = 3a1 + 4c1 (53)
A
[2]
3 = 5a1 + 6d1 (54)
A
[2]
4 = 7b2 + 8c1 (55)
A
[2]
5 = 9b3 + 10d1 (56)
A
[2]
6 = 11c1 + 12d1 (57)
This system of equations is full rank as well. Since, the queries have the same structure and
the symbol indices are chosen randomly and privately, the scheme is private.
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5.4 Discussion and Further Extensions: Extension to M ≥ 3:
In this section, we show how the ideas of M = 2 can be extended to M ≥ 3. We discuss our
additional ideas via the following example. In this example, we consider a (K,R,M,N) =
(6, 2, 3, 4) storage system, whose structure is shown in Table 7. Note that, in this example,
our graph formulation fails to represent the storage structure since M > 2, however, we
can use the graph structure in [55] as R = 2 in this example. In the following, we only
show an achievable scheme for this example without any claim of optimality. In addition
to introducing dependency as in the previous schemes, we have a new insight in this case,
which is to exploit processed side information.
Database 1 (D1) Database 2 (D2) Database 3 (D3) Database 4 (D4)
W1 W1 W2 W3
W2 W4 W3 W4
W5 W6 W6 W5
Table 7: Contents of databases for the (6, 2, 3, 4) system. Note that, here M = 3.
Our scheme works with L = 18 symbols from F2. We permute the indices of the messages
uniformly, independently and privately at the user side. We denote the permuted message
symbols of W1,W2, · · · ,W6 by the vectors (a1, · · · , aL), (b1, · · · , bL), · · · , (f1, · · · , fL).
The idea of our scheme is to extend the greedy algorithm of [9] to our setting (see Table 8).
To that end, the user starts by downloading 2 individual symbols from every message from
every database in round 1. Hence, the user downloads a1, a2, b1, b2, e1, e2 from database 1,
a3, a4, d1, d2, f1, f2 from database 2, and so on.
Returning to the scheme in [9], the user downloads 2-sums in round 2 from all databases.
The undesired symbols in round 1 are exploited as side information in round 2. In our case,
this is applicable in databases 1 and 2. Therefore, the user downloads the sums a5 + b3,
a6+ b4, a7+e3, a8+e4 from database 1, and a9+d3, a10+d4, a11+f3, a12+f4. We complete
round 2 by downloading b5+e5, b6+e6 from database 1, and d5+f5, d6+f6 from database 2
to satisfy the privacy constraint by downloading all combinations of the 2-sums.
In order to proceed with the achievable scheme, we need to generate side information
in round 3, which consists of 3-sums. At this point, we note two issues: First, we did
not exploit the side information generated from W3 in round 1, as the messages W1,W3 do
not appear together at any database. Second, we note that the side information needed
in round 3 does not appear directly in any other database unlike [9], i.e., in round 3, we
need the side information to be of the form b + e and d + f , which are not available in
any other database. This motivates the use of processed side information, i.e., combine side
information generated at multiple databases into a single side information that is usable at
another database. There are two types of processing in this example, which are: combining
double 2-sums and combining triple 2-sums.
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Database 1 Database 2 Database 3 Database 4
a1, a2 a3, a4 b3, b4 c3, c4
b1, b2 d1, d2 c1, c2 d3, d4
e1, e2 f1, f2 f3, f4 e3, e4
a5 + b3 a9 + d3 b7 + c7 c9 + d7
a6 + b4 a10 + d4 b8 + c8 c5 + d8
a7 + e3 a11 + f3 b9 + f5 c7 + e7
a8 + e4 a12 + f4 b5 + f9 c8 + e8
b5 + e5 d5 + f5 c9 + f7 d5 + e9
b6 + e6 d6 + f6 c5 + f8 d9 + e5
a13 + b7 + e7 a16 + d7 + f7 b1 + c3 + f1 c1 + d1 + e1
a14 + b8 + e8 a17 + d8 + f8 b2 + c4 + f2 c2 + d2 + e2
a15 + b9 + e9 a18 + d9 + f9 b6 + c6 + f6 c6 + d6 + e6
Table 8: An achievable scheme for the (6, 2, 3, 4) storage system.
First, for combining double 2-sums to get a single side information equation, we download
b7 + c7 from database 3 and c7 + e7 from database 4. By adding the two 2-sums (modulo-2
addition), we get b7 + e7 which can be used as side information in database 1. Similarly,
we obtain the single side information b8 + e8 by adding b8 + c8 and c8 + e8 and again use it
in database 1. Next, we generate the side information needed in database 2. We combine
c9 + f7 from database 3 with c9 + d7 from database 4 to get d7 + f7, and combine c5 + f8
from database 3 and c5 + d8 from database 4 to get d8 + f8.
Second, we can create extra side information by combining triple 2-sums. To see that,
we can add b5 + e5 from database 1, b5 + f9 from database 3, and d9 + e5 from database 4
to create the side information d9 + f9, which can be exploited in database 2. Similarly, we
can add d5 + f5 from database 2, b9 + f5 from database 3, and d5 + e9 from database 4 to
get b9 + e9, which can be exploited in database 1.
To introduce dependency in databases 3 and 4 as in the previous schemes, we can down-
load b1 + c3 + f1, b2 + c4 + f2, c1 + d1 + e1, and c2 + d2 + e2, which result from round 1.
Using this scheme, the user gets 18 desired symbols out of total 60 downloads, resulting
in RPIR =
18
60
= 3
10
. This outperforms the achievable scheme of [55], which achieves 1
N
= 1
4
.
We note that this is the first instance of using processed side information in PIR. Fur-
ther, the presented scheme achieves the bound in Lemma 1 with equality, i.e., H(A
[m]
n |W \
{Wm},Q) =
L
R
= 9, which may be promising. However, a curious question remains which
should be investigated further, which is: Can we compress the downloads in the same manner
of the achievable scheme for the cyclic graphs by exploiting dependencies?
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the PIR problem from non-replicated and non-colluding
databases. We studied the (K,R, 2, N) storage systems, where every database stores M = 2
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messages. This system is uniquely described by an R-regular graph. We proved a general
upper bound, which depends on the spread of the graph. We derived the capacity of two
classes of graphs, namely: cyclic graphs and fully-connected graphs. For these two classes of
graphs, we proposed novel achievable schemes, whose retrieval rate matches the developed
upper bound. Our results showed that non-replication significantly hurts the retrieval rate.
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